The Turkish Army: Guardian of Turkish Secularism???

Last Friday, 29 July, Borzou Daragahi declared in the  Los Angeles Times that “[n]early the entire leadership of Turkey’s armed forces departed en masse Friday, local media reported, in the latest sign of tension between the country’s once dominant military old guard and a rising pious Muslim political elite. Turkish media reported that the army’s chief of general staff, Gen. [Işık Koşaner], and the officers heading the Turkish ground forces, navy and air force resigned their posts”.[1]  But, Daragahi, a U.S. citizen of Iranian descent, then goes on to explain that “Turkey’s semi-official Anatolia news agency first quoted the [Koşaner] as writing, ‘I resign my post as I deemed necessary’. The agency then rescinded the report and described the top general’s departure as a ‘retirement’”.[2]  From Ankara, the Reuter’s agency’s Ümit Bektaş clarifies: “Turkey said on Friday [, 29 July] its top four military chiefs were all seeking retirement, in moves that appeared to reflect a deep rift between the [so-called] secularist military and a government with roots in political Islam. State-run Anatolian news agency said the head of the armed forces General [Işık Koşaner] and the commanders of the ground, naval and air forces were all stepping down, in what some Turkish media initially described as resignations. The reason for the generals’ move was not immediately clear, but tensions between the military and the government of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan have run high in recent years. The Supreme Military Council is due to hold a major twice-yearly meeting next week dealing with key appointments and President Abdullah Gul and Erdogan met General [Koşaner] on Friday to discuss the matter. Following the announcement Mr. Erdogan met the head of Turkey’s gendarmerie paramilitary force, General Necdet Özel, and they subsequently went separately to the presidential palace to meet President Abdullah Gul, fuelling speculation General Özel may be appointed to replace General [Koşaner]. By tradition, the head of the ground forces replaces the armed forces chief when he retires. Friction between the government and military, traditionally guardians of the secular state, has been fueled by the continuing trial of 200 military officers accused of plotting to overthrow the government. The “Sledgehammer” case, arising from an alleged coup plan presented at an army seminar in 2003, is one of several setting Turkey’s secularist establishment against Prime Minister Erdogan’s ruling AK party. Critics say AK has a secret Islamist agenda, an allegation it denies. Some 165 military personnel, including more than 40 generals, are in custody in the coup plot trials, severely damaging the military’s operational ability”.[3]  That was last week, and then this week the Supreme Military Council or Yüksek Askeri Şura in Turkish [Y.A.Ş.] took place.

From Istanbul, the FT’s David Gardner recounts: “Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prime minister, sat stone-faced and alone at the head of the Supreme Military Council, where elected officials hitherto rubber-stamped the edicts of Turkey’s overmighty generals, who sat at top table. He was flanked by the one commander to survive last week’s cull of the army’s top brass, now the new chief of staff – and by civilian ministers. Other generals sat below the political salt. After a decade of clashes between Turkey’s powerful army and a government with its roots in political Islam, Mr Erdogan, re-elected in June by a landslide, was leaving no doubt he was in charge. Mr Erdogan has clipped the army’s wings and imposed new commanders. But this decisive battle does not conclude the war. Skirmishes will continue so long as the military retains its financial and judicial autonomy, and unresolved conflicts – with Kurdish insurgents inside Turkey and with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea – offer the generals a path back to influence. Yet that is not how it looks now”.[4]

The continuous power struggle between different elite groups has now apparently reached a significant turning point in Turkey. On the one hand, there is the old, Kemalist elite, fearful of losing its “privileges” and “freedoms” and represented by the TSK and TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen Association). And then, there is the new elite, the AKP, its leadership and the now wealthy Muslim business leaders, represented by MÜSİAD (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen). In view of these organisations different appreciations of Turkey’s external image and internal composition, it is interesting to note that Ümit Boyner, the chairperson of the executive board of TÜSİAD, declared recently that “[i]mportant opportunities might come out [of the Arab Awakening currently sweeping through the Middle East] for Turkey; in the first place, the value of Turkey’s model is rising”.[5]  Mrs Boyner, appropriately dyed-blonde and bare-headed, is clearly capitalising on Turkey’s position as the single so-called secular nation state in the region, as has been done by many others over the past months.[6]  But, in reality, the whole notion of Turkish Secularism, though well-established and oft-repeated, appears like a tenuous proposition at best. As I wrote some time ago, “the term [secularism], particularly in its French form of laicité (at the root of Turkey’s laiklik), denotes a strict separation of church (or religion) and state. And, the theory is that Turkey, as a result of the [Kemalist] reform movement, known as the İnkılap, is a secular state. In reality, however, ever since the Turkish state abolished the Caliphate [, the Meşihat or Şeyhülislamlık] and the Ministry of Pious Endowments in 1924, the Turkish Republic has regulated its citizens’ religious life through the Religious Affairs Directorate, or Diyanet, a branch of government attached to the office of the prime minister”.[7]  As a result, claiming that the Republic of Turkey is a secular state appears somewhat difficult. A scholar like İhsan Yılmaz has therefore suggested the term “Lausannian Islam” (Lozan İslamı) to refer to Turkey’s state-run version of the Prophet Muhammad’s religion.[8]  Yılmaz employs the names of the Swiss city where the territorial body of the Republic was decided upon to name the “official version of Islam” promulgated by the Turkish state since 1924. The Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) is seen in Turkey as a quasi-sacred document which reversed the Sèvres agreement that carved up the Ottoman territories (10 August 1920) among the victors of the Great War (1914-18). The well-known and vocal Kemalist Suna Kili, who in 2008 ‘received the “Woman of the Enlightenment” Award in Turkey for her contributions to the Turkish Enlightenment’,[9] already in 1980 declared unashamedly that “’to the Kemalists, [secularism] means not only separation of state and society but also state control of the Moslem religious establishment”.[10]  The Turkish Diyanet [Religious Affairs Directorate] on its own website describes its aim as “to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places”.[11]

In spite of the reality that Turkish laiklik does not really denote secularism in any objective sense, the Turkish Army (TSK or Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri) is known the world over as championing a secular state of affairs. The BBC leads the way in spreading this view among a global audience: “The army sees itself as the guardian of Turkey’s secularism”.[12]  The Arab broadcaster Al Jazeera does not deviate from this well-established line either, steadfastly referring to “Turkey’s secularist military”.[13]  And now only a few days ago, in light of the recent retirements/dismissals, the voice of one of the most prominent atheists the world over has also been heard pontificating about Turkish Secularism and the Turkish Army: Christopher Hitchens in his aptly-titled op-ed “Turkish military is no longer the guardian of secularism”.[14]

As an outspoken Islamophobe,[15] Hitchens’ “deep knowledge” of Turkish history and current affairs shines through every sentence in his op-ed. And rather insightfully, he maintains that “the ‘secular’ military elite in Turkey had already sold out a number of the values that were real to Ataturk and necessary for Turkey’s integration into the Eurosphere”, referring first to the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and in the second instance, to the Turkish refusal to partake in the Bush invasion of Iraq in 2003. Hitchens lays bare his own proclivities and preferences in this instance. The fact that the invasion of Cyprus was undertaken to put a halt to a policy of “genocide”, as the Greek Cypriot policy regarding Turkish Cypriots was characterised by the journalist and Cold War double agent Harry Scott Gibbons in 1997 book on the issue,[16] is a point not merely of historical interest but nevertheless easily escapes everyone’s attention. As a cheerleader for the Bush White House, Hitch wholeheartedly supported the American invasion of the territory created by the British in the aftermath of the Great War [Iraq], whereas global public opinion, including the Turkish one, was vehemently opposed to this military  misadventure. But, the military’s brutal seizure of power in Turkey on 12 September 1980 does not appear to figure prominently in Hitch’s awareness of the TSK’s misdeeds. Following the military takeover and the suspension of civilian control, the military promulgated a new constitution that had a lasting effect on Turkey’s life and relationship with Islam. The new constitution was the preamble to Turkey’s return to civilian rules and the ascent of Turgut Özal (1927-93). Political scientists have since coined the term “Neo-Ottoman” to refer to the latter’s pro-free market and pro-Islamic policies.

But this is not the place to deal with Özal and his legacy, instead we are looking at the role of the military as the “guardian of secularism” in Turkey. Many aspects of the 1982 Constitution are frowned upon, and last year the Turkish public voted wholeheartedly in favour of changing certain parts of the Constitution – on 12 September 2010 to be precise.[17]  In my opinion,  Article 24 seems particularly controversial but is at present not destined to be changed or abolished, albeit that Alevi believers, who represent a sizable minority in Turkey argue in favour of such a policy.[18]  Article 24 starts off with the phrase, “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction”, but then also contains this section: “Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools”.[19]  And “[i]nstruction in religious culture and moral education” means the teaching of the Hanefi school of thought [mezhep] in Sunni Islam. Prior to the 1982 Constitution, official religious instruction was limited in Turkey. The theologian and AKP-member Hadi Adanalı states convincingly that “[i]n 1927, all courses concerning religion were excluded from the curriculum of primary, secondary, and high schools on the basis that non-Muslims also live in Turkey”.[20]  During the Demokrat Parti (DP) rule (1950-60) a limited form of opt-in religious education was again introduced in Turkey’s classrooms. Adanalı explains in the following way: the “new [DP] government introduced a religion course into secondary schools. This time, if the parents wanted to exempt their children from the course, they had to apply to the school with a written request. After nearly ten years, in 1967, the religion course was introduced to the 1^st and 2^nd grades of high school. Students, however, were enrolled for the course with the written request of their parents. In 1975, the course was extended to the third (last)  grade of the high schools”.[21]  Still, one could argue that, prior to the 1982 Constitution, the Turkish public had enjoyed the freedom to consider religion and religious education a private matter, and not necessarily a state-ordained duty in spite of the Diyanet’s existence and best efforts. Due to the military’s good offices, “[c]urrently, religious education courses begin at the 4^th grade of primary school and continue throughout secondary and high schools. From the 4^th to the 8^th grade, classes consist of two hours per week. At the high school level, there is one hour of class per week Thus, a student who has graduated from high school receives 8 continuous years of religion courses. There are no fixed books for the course. Rather, each school decides which book to follow — provided that the book for each level is approved by the Ministry of Education”.[22]  In the 1990s, the erstwhile pupils who had enjoyed the benefit of continuous and compulsory “[e]ducation and instruction in religion and ethics” during their school years had become adult citizens endowed with the power to vote . . . and, arguably partly due to their school education, these Turkish citizens started to favour political parties that used adherence and allegiance to Islam as part of their political message. In 1994, Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (RP) won a landslide victory in Turkish local elections, bringing ‘Islamist mayors to office in more than two dozen major Turkish cities, including Istanbul and Ankara’.[23]

On 28 February 1997,[24] the Refah Partisi was shut down leading to a whole array of successor parties springing up. One of these
successors was the AKP or Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi that has been heading Turkey since 2002 under Tayyip Erdoğan’s charismatic leadership. Throughout the 1990s, many people over and again were wondering about the sudden rise of the RP and why Islam had once again become a visible part of Turkey’s political discourse. One could argue that this increased visibility was due to the effects of the continuous and compulsory “[e]ducation and instruction in religion and ethics” during Turkish pupils’ school years, as stipulated in the military’s 1982 Constitution for the Secular Republic of Turkey . . .

There are many reasons why religion, Islam and Christianity in particular, was rearing its ugly head throughout the 1980s, but on a political level, it seems, the role of the U.S. State Department cannot be underestimated. At the time, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s theories were very much in vogue. The great man himself, President Carter’s Security Adviser, said in January 1979 that an “arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries”. The authoritative TIME magazine then provided this exegesis: “In the broadest and grandest of measurements, this crisis crescent envisioned by President Carter’s National Security Adviser reaches all the way from Indochina to southern Africa. In practical terms, however, what Brzezinski is really speaking of are the nations that stretch across the southern flank of the Soviet Union from the Indian subcontinent to Turkey, and southward through the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa”. This was an area in danger of falling prey to the Communist predator state of the Soviet Union. And Brzezinski’s answer was to utilise Islam as a way of securing this “arc of crisis”, as a way of mobilising these nations against the Communist threat of the Soviet Union.[25]  His support of the Mujahideen is well-known,[26] as is his part in the rise to power of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan on 5 July 1977. Zia-ul-Haq subsequently thoroughly Islamised Pakistani society, and then, on 12 September 1980, the Turkish Army intervened as well . . .

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[1] Borzou Daragahi, “Turkey’s top military leaders resign en masse” The Los Angeles Times (29 July 2011). http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/29/world/la-fgw-turkey-generals-resign-20110730.

[2] Borzou Daragahi, “Turkey’s top military leaders resign en masse”.

[3] Ümit Bektaş, “Secularist Turkish generals ‘retire’ in rift with government of Islamic roots” Reuters (29 July 2011). http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/29/160001.html.

[4] David Gardner, “Erdogan’s reshuffle clips military’s wings” Financial Times (05 August 2011). http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0c9b09f8-bf78-11e0-90d5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1UBHXxC8v.

[5] “Turkey’s top boss cautious about Arab Spring” Hürriyet Daily News (04 August 2011). http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkeys-top-boss-cautious-about-arab-spring-2011-08-04.

[6] “The Turkish Model??? Egypt after Mubarak” A Pseudo-Ottoman Blog (01 March 2011). https://sitanbul.wordpress.com/2011/03/01/the-turkish-model-egypt-after-mubarak/.

[7] C. Erimtan, “Secularism, beer and bikinis” Hürriyet Daily News (10 March 2011). http://tiny.cc/6msiy.

[8] İhsan Yılmaz, “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey” The Muslim World, 95, 3 (July
2005), pp. 385-411.

[9] “Prof.Dr. Suna Kili (Senior Part Time)” Boğaziçi University. http://www.pols.boun.edu.tr/faculty.aspx?iid=11.

[10] Suna Kili, Suna Kili, “Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey” in International Political Science Review, I, 3 (1980), p. 392.

[1] http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/tanitim.asp?id=13.

[12] “Army ‘concerned’ by Turkey vote” BBC News (28 April 2007). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602375.stm.

[13] “Turkey to appoint new military leadership” Al Jazeera (01 August 2011). http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/08/20118113584619619.html.

[14] “Christopher Hitchens: Turkish military is no longer the guardian of secularism” The National Post (03 August 2011). http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/08/03/christopher-hitchens-turkish-military-is-no-longer-the-guardian-of-secularism/.

[15] “Christopher Hitchens: It isn’t just Islam” ” The National Post (08 September 2010). http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2010/09/08/christopher-hitchens-it-isn%E2%80%99t-just-islam/.

[16] Harry Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files (London: Charles Bravos, 1997).

[17] Cfr. “Turkey’s referendum on new constitutional future” Euronews (September 2010). http://www.euronews.net/2010/09/02/turkey-s-referendum-on-new-constitutional-future/, “Turkey says ‘yes’; gives go-ahead
to more reforms” Today’s Zaman (12 September 2010). http://www.todayszaman.com/news-221526-turkey-says-yes-gives-go-ahead-to-more-reforms.html.

[18] İzgi Güngör, “Alevis to file mass lawsuits against compulsory religious courses” Hüriyet Daily News (27 February 2011). http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=alevis-to-open-mass-lawsuits-against-compulsory-religious-courses-2011-01-17.

[19] 1982 Constitution. http://www.constitution.org/cons/turkey/part2.htm.

[20] A. Hadi Adanalı, “The Many Dimensions of Religious Instruction in Turkey” International Association for Religious
Freedom. http://www.iarf.net/REBooklet/Turkey.htm.

[21] A. Hadi Adanalı, “The Many Dimensions of Religious Instruction in Turkey”.

[22] A. Hadi Adanalı, “The Many Dimensions of Religious Instruction in Turkey”.

[23] “Turkey Loses its Islamist Figurehead: Erbakan has Died” A Pseudo-Ottoman Blog (28 February 2011). https://sitanbul.wordpress.com/2011/02/28/turkey-loses-its-islamist-figurehead-erbakan-has-died/, Sabri Sayari, “Turkey’s Islamist Challenge” Middle East Quarterly (September 1996), pp. 35-43. http://www.meforum.org/314/turkeys-islamist-challenge.

[24] “1997 – Postmodern Coup” Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/tu-military-coup-1997.htm.

[25] “IRAN: The Crescent of Crisis – 1” Time (15 January 1979). http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,919995-1,00.html.

[26] Cfr. C. Erimtan, “The War in Afghanistan: The legacy of Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Volatile Situation in Pakistan” Today’s Zaman (07 October 2010). http://tiny.cc/7gsi2.